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We analyze a dynamic implication of an evolutionary process in a population where both
actions and network structures change over time.
At every period, a coordination game is played by players who are linked with each other.
An asymmetric cost of a link is incorporated. Under this setting each player myopically
adapts with its circumstance consisting of the network structure and the action proﬁle.
In a stochastically stable state there are link cost patterns such that all players play a
pareto dominant equilibrium strategy of a coordination game. This is the most diﬀerent result
from a standard stochastic evolutionary models that selects a risk dominant equilibrium.
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11 Introduction
Network structeres are observed in many socio-economic organizations. Market is one of or-
ganizations that has a netwok structure. Firms have various network structures which aﬀect
their production technology. A coalition is interpreted as a network because networks are es-
tablished by individual incentives for linking. Financial network systems, network externalities,
friendships, cartel of ﬁrms are examples of entities that have network structures.
In these organizations it is essential that there are two distinct choices. Of course each indi-
vidual must decides whom he should link with. But for playing games with linked companions
the individual must also choices an action of a game.
A transaction in a market occurs only if two players-a buyer and a seller- meet and play a
game. Standarization of technologies or languages in a population depends on the network or
coalitional structure. But network structures or coalitional structures also depend on the action
proﬁle in the population. We should deal with these two phenomenon simultaneously.
The reasonableness of diﬀerent network structures is the basic motivation for our model. By
assuming that the network structure itself is subject to evolutionary pressure, we depart from
the conventional models of evolutionary equilibrium selection models. Endogenous interaction
structures are itself an object of study. Individually each player adds or servers links in comfor-
mity with its own interest. As related works for engogenous interactin structures, there are Bala
and Goyal (2000), Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). Both study deal with an individual incentive
to form a link using a directed graph. They study a dynamic stability of the network formation.
They show emergence of ineﬃcient network structure.
Our model in this paper investigate a dynamic stability of an interaction scheme. But our
model is more general than Bala and Goyal, Jackson and Wolinsky because we deal with an
equilibrium selection problem in a coordination game. In a nongeneric two by two coordination
game, two strict Nash equilibria exists. When bulk of a population plays an action of the strict
Nash equilibria, it is best for an individual player to accomodate own behavior to the action.
Therefore the action of strict Nash equilibrium is called a conventionin in the population who
plays the coordination game. To select an equilibrium, Harsanyi and Selten (1988) presents
concepts such that pareto domination and risk domination. In some cases, we select a distinct
equilibrium(convention) due to each concept. Models of a dynamic equilibrium selection is called
an evolutionary game theory or a learning theory. One of strict Nash equilibria is selected as
a stable state of some adaptation process. By introducing perpetual experimental actions or
mutations into the adaptation process, Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993)
shows that such an adaptation process selects a risk dominant equilibrium of a two by two
coordination game. They express the adaptation process through irreducible Markov chains on
a ﬁnite state space.1 An asymptotic frequency distribution of the visiting states is a selection
criterion:over the long run, the process selects those states on which the asymptotic frequency
ditribution puts positive probability. Those states are called stochastically stable states (Young
(1993) ).2 Both studies assume that players are radomly matched at every period.3 Random
matching moddels do not entertain incentives for choices of adversaries. In our model allowing
1Due to perpetual mutations, the process becomes irreducible.
2Kandori et,al. call those states long run equilibria.
3Precisely Young (1993) investigate a recurrent game. A population is partitioned into n classes. At every
period one player is drawn at random from each of the n populations to play a game. Under adequate assumptions,
this process coincides with a random matching model.
2individual choices for link formations, incentives for choices of adversaries is incorporated into
an evolutionary equilibrium selection model well. It is assumed that each player can play a
coordination game only if they are linked with a network. That is, a play of the coordination
game occurs only if there is a link by which players connect with each other. We assume that
it costs for players to establish an active link. But if one side player of a link incurs the link
cost, then both side players can play the game. This assumption peculiarises an individual
incentive for a connection. We are interested in the inﬂuence of the endogenous link formation
and the costs for establishing links on individual behavior in games of coordination. Blume
(1993) and Ellison (1993) study evolutionary equilibrium selection models with an exogenous
network structure. Addresses of players are ﬁxed on a circle or a lattice. Because adversaries
are less than random matching models, their models are called local interaction models. Ellison
argues the time for the evolutionary system to converge to an stable state and shows that in
a local interaction structure, more rapidly the system converges. They shows also that the
stable state is the risk dominant equilibrium. But our model shows that all individuals play the
pareto dominant action in a stochastically stable state by introducing an evolutionary process
of network formations.
Overview of the Model
A two by two symmetric coordination game is repeatedly played by anonymous individuals.
Because of the anonymity, a strategic interaction like a repeated game is not allowed for. That
is, we suppose that individuals forms a large population or society. The game is played by two
players only if at least one of them must incurs the link cost. Therefore players must decide
about both actions and links, given an environment. The environment is a pair of a network
formation and an action proﬁle of other players. This decision is called an adaptation. Best
response dynamics (Matsui(1992)) is exerted for the adaptation process4. The state space of the
dynamics is the set of all pairs of network formations and action proﬁles of the coordination game.
Given a pair of a network formation and an action proﬁle of the last period( the state of the
last period), a player myopically adjusts its behavior subject to best response to the pair(state).
The myopic adjustment is justiﬁed by small degree of friction for revisions of behaviors 5 or
bounded rationality of players.
As for the adaptation, a period is divided into four steps. At the ﬁrst step a pair of players is
randomly choosen and one side player decides to establishes(maintains) or severs an active link
with the other player given a state of the last t¡1 period. After this decision, an experimentation
of a link formation occurs with a small probability °. If a link is established at the ﬁrst step,
then the link is severed with the probability °. At the end of this second step, the network
formation of the t period is determined. At the third step, a player is randomly choosen and
adjusts the action of the two by two coordination game, given the network formed at the second
step. After this decision, an experimentation of an action choice occurs with a small probability
". If an action is chosen at the third step, the other action is tried to choose with the probability
". At the end of this fourth step, an action proﬁle of the period t is determined. After these four
steps, the coordination games are played by players who are linked with the other players in the
network established at the period. This sequential adaptation rule is similar to Jackson,M and
A.Watts (2001).
4Precisely our dinamics is called better reply dynamics.
5A perfect foresight dynamics coincides with best response dynamics as the friction rate becomes small. See
Matusi and Matsuyama (1995).
3A homogenous Markov process on the state space is deﬁned due to the above adaptation
process. Since this process is irreducible and aperiodic, there is a unique stationary distribution
and has an ergodic property. As the probability of both experimentations vanishes, states with
the strict positive probability of the stationary ditributation, that is, the stochastically stable
states, are investigated.
The most diﬀerent assumption from other models of this reserach ﬁeld is that we itroduce an
asymmetricity of link costs. The population is partitioned into two types of link costs-high type
or low type. Aggresive ﬁrms for standarization of a technology are applicable to the low type.
A person who follows the philosophy of isolationism may be the high type. This asymmetricity
generates the pareto dominant equilibrium action in the stochastically stable state.
Results of Part One (Direct Link Case)
All cases of costs parameters are investigated. For each link cost level, all recurrent(or ab-
sorbing) states of our adaptation process without experiments are shown. We call the adaptation
process without experiments the unperturbed process. From these states, we select the stochas-
tically stable network formations and conventions according to an algorithm shown at Kandori
et,al (1993) and Young (1993,1998).
At almost every cases, two strict Nash equilibria(conventions) emerge in recurrent states
of the unperturbed process. If the low link cost parameter is suﬃciently small, the only low
type players support the whole network. At almost every cases, fully connected networks are
stoichastically stable.
For some cost parameter cases, the pareto dominant convention emerges. If each cost level
is enough diﬀerent, then high cost players free ride on low types for network formation. Then a
density of links is coarser than full connected networks. Risk dominant convention maintains at
this coarser network because a gain from risk dominant action is smaller than pareto dominant
one. This state is less robust to perpetual mutations if the number of low cost type players is
small. Since only a few players support the network, the convention of the society depends more
strongly on the few players’ behavior than random matching models.
Precedences of this ﬁeld of research
In this paper links are costly for establishing and maintaining. As for evolutionary network
formations and coordination games, there are several precedences. Droste,E. R. Gilles, and
C.Jhonson (2000), Goyal,S and F.Vega-Redondo (2000), Skyrms,B. and R.Pemantle (2000),
Jackson,M. and A.Watts (2001). All these works introduce a link cost which leads us to study
the incentives of players to establish a network. Droste et al. ﬁx players on a circle assigning its
address. Cost considerations of social interaction are incorporated by considering endogenous
neighborhoods on the circle. That is, players can create their own costly communication network
in some neighborhood. As a stochastically stable point, only the risk dominance strategy is
sustainable on the circle. Goyal and Vega-Redondo shows if a link cost is suﬃciently high then
pareto dominant equilibrium becomes stochastically stable. They study the case also that two
distinct players linked with each other through a path of links can play a coordination game. In
this case a center-sponsered network emerges in the long run. Their work generates some near
conclusions. Jacson and Watts assumes the adaopation process to be sequential-in the ﬁrst step
a link is adapted and in the second step actions-and introduce a convex link cost function on the
number of linked players. The latter assumption stops the growth of the network size at some
levels. They show also that there are cases that generates the pareto dominant convention.
4This paper is construct as follows. In section 2 networks and a social game(coordination
game)used in our model are deﬁned. An adaptation rule and corresponding Markov chain are
explaied in section 3. In section 4 recurrent states of our unperturbed process and stochastically
stable states are investigated. Section 5 concludes this Part One (Direct Link Case).
2 Networks and social game
2.1 Networks
We consider a population which consists of ﬁnite players. The set of the players is N =
f1;2;::: ;ng. It is assumed that n ¸ 3 since we are interested in emergence of convention
and evolutionary stable network formation patterns in a large population. Two players are con-
nected with each other by so called links. Potential links which a player i can add or servers are
denoted by gi = (gi1;gi2;::: ;gii¡1;gii+1;::: ;gn) where gij 2 f0;1g. If the player i incurs the
cost of maintaining/establishing the link between i and j, gij becomes 1. If the player i does not
incurs the cost of maintaining/establishing the link between i and j, then gij becomes 0. Note
that even if gij is 0, gji may be 1. This case (gij = 0 and gji = 1) means that there is only one
link which connects player i and j, and the cost of this connection is incured only by player j.
A link gij is called an active link for i and a passive link for j.
Deﬁnition 1. Player i establishes an active link with player j if gij = 1.
Player i severs an active link with player j if gij = 0.
We call a (n¡1)£n dimensional vector g consisting of 0 and 1 such that g = (g1;g2;::: ;gn)
a network. The set of all networks is denoted by G. That is, G = ff0;1gn¡1gn.
A player can play a coordination game descrived at next Section 3 and get his(her) payoﬀ
only if he(she) must be connected/linked with other players. There are two ways of connection
which are called as direct links and indirect links.
Deﬁnition 2. Distinct players i;j 2 N are directly linked if maxfgij;gjig = 1.
Let ¯ gij ´ maxfgij;gjig. If player i and j are directly linked, then ¯ gij = 1. A player plays a
game and gets a positive payoﬀ only if there must be an other player j such that ¯ gij = 1.
To deﬁne indirect connection, we use a concept of a path between player i and j.
Deﬁnition 3. There is a path in g between player i and player j if ¯ gij = 1 or there exist
some players j1;j2;::: ;jm 2 N such that ¯ gij1 = ¯ gj1j2 = ::: = ¯ gjm¡1jm = ¯ gjmj = 1.
When there is a path between i and j we represent it as i
¯ g
Ã! j. Without confusion, player
i and j is indirectly linked if there exist some paths between them. In section 5, we investigate
the case where player i can play a coordination game with player j if they are linked indirectly.
Here we prepare some notations to deﬁne payoﬀs concluding a cost for establishing a link (
at Subsection 2.3 below). Nd(i;g) denotes the set of all players in network g with whom player i
has established links. Precisely Nd(i;g) ´ fj 2 N j gij = 1g. The cardinality of the set Nd(i;g)
is ºd(i;g) ´ jNd(i;g)j. The set of all players directly linked with player i is Nd(i;¯ g). Precisely
Nd(i; ¯ g) ´ fj 2 N j ¯ gij = 1g. The cardinality of the set Nd(i; ¯ g) is ºd(i;¯ g) ´ jNd(i;¯ g)j. The set
5of all players indirectly linked with a player i is denoted by N(i;¯ g) ´ fj 2 N j i
¯ g
Ã! jg. We
also deﬁne º(i;¯ g) ´ jN(i; ¯ g)j.
To conﬁrm above deﬁnitions and notations, we use an example as Figure 1 below. Network
formations are characterized by graph theory. A network g is a directed graph. Its node is a
player and its directed edge is a link between two distinct players. A player at a root of an edge
incurs the cost for the link.
In this example, N = f1;2;3;4g. g = ((g12;g13;g14);(g21;g23;g24);(g31;g32;g34);(g41;g42;g43)) =




Thus we can regard a network g as a graph. We identify the set of networks G as the set of
graphs.
Deﬁnition 4. Subgraph6 g0 ½ g is a component of g if for any nodes(players) i;j of a graph
g0 there exists some paths between the node(player) i and the node(player) j such that if i is a
node of g0, j is a node of g and gij = 1 then g0
ij = 1.
Deﬁnition 5. A network with only one component is called connected. A connected network
g is said to be minimally connected if the network obtained by deleting any single link is not
connected.
Our model predicts emergence of following fully connected networks in many cases.
Deﬁnition 6. A network g is fully connected if ¯ gij = 1 for any i,j 2 N.
One sided link is more eﬃcient than two sided one. It will be shown that our evolutionary
model often selects following eﬃcient networks.
Deﬁnition 7. A network g is eﬃciently formed if for any i, j 2 N (gij = 1 ! gji = 0).
Let Ge denote the set of eﬃciently formed and fully connected networks.
Using examples drawn at Figure 2, we conﬁrm these characterization. Figure 2(a) is an
example of minimally and eﬃciently connected graphs. It is called a star network graphs.
Figure 2(b) is not a eﬃciently but fully connected network. Figure 2(c) is an eﬃciently connected
network.
6g
0 ½ g if all nodes of g





Figure 2(a). Figure 2(b). Figure 2(c).
2.2 Link costs
Suppose that players must incure cost for maintaining and adding their active links. To play a
game or to transact with other players, each player may incur the cost of links. By introducing
the cost of links, it becomes possible to analyze individual incentives for playing or participanting
to a game.
Oﬀ course, if for a link between player i and j only player i incurs its cost (that is, gij is
1 and gji is 0) then without incuring the cost player j can play a game with player i. Thus
if any pair of players play a game then at least one player of the pair must incur the cost for
connection (¯ gij = 1). Hereafter we call the unit cost for establishing/maintaing any active link
a link cost. The link cost does not depend on the opponent player linked with. Let ni be the
number of active links that player i establishes/maintains. Player i pays an unit cost k(ni) for
maintaining/establishing his active link, leading to a total cost of nik(ni) for player i.
Generally the unit cost function, k(ni), is depending on the number of active links for the
concerning player. But at the begining a constant cost is assumed for convenience of analysis.
That is, for any number of active links the cost of a link is k.7
The most important diﬀerence from preceeding works, Goyal and Vega-Redondo(1999) and
Jackson and Watts(2001) is that we introduce an asymmetricity of the link cost. The link cost
may depends with whether a player has invested much resource to a link technology yet. The
amount of the investment is regarded as the main factor which decides whether a player is high
type or not. For example, maintenance technology of a traﬃc,.... To represent this two types of
link costs players are assumed to be partitioned into two groups. High link cost type and Low
link cost type. Type h player has a high cost techbology for his active link and type l has low
one. Any player in the subset Nx of N has unit constant link cost kx for maintaing/establishing
an active link, where x is h or l. Let kh > kl. 8
Assumption 1. All players are partitioned into two types of link costs. That is, N = Nh [Nl,
Nh \ Nl = Á, Nh 6= Á and Nl 6= Á.
7In section, we investigate the case that a cost of a link has convexity property depending on the number of
active links.
8The number of active links becomes more, the unit cost for maintaining its active links may grow higher.
Friendship relation is a good example for this situation. This is modeled as convexity of a cost function of the
number of activelinks. This case is compared with our model at Section 5 of Part Two(coupled paper) .
72.3 Social games
Two players linked with each other play a symmetric coordination game called as a Social Game.
Each player has two alternatives or actions, named as ®, ¯. Let A be the set of actions. This









Note that the payoﬀs in the Table 1 is not necessary real payoﬀs of the players because of
the existence of the link cost. If a player has an active link then the player gets a net payoﬀ
which is less than the payoﬀ as descrived at the Table.
One of the most interesting things is the equilibrium selection problem with an endogenous
network formation.
Assumption 2. In the symmetric coordination game, payoﬀs satisfy
d > f; b > e; d > b and d + e < b + f:
Lemma 2.1. If the symmetric coordination game satisﬁes Assumption 2, two action pairs,
(®;®) and (¯;¯) are strict Nash equilibria9 in the coordination game.
Proof. Since d > f, ® is a unique best response to itself. ¯ is best response to itsself. Thus they
are strict Nash equilibria.
¥
If there is no confusion we call these strict Nash equilibria the conventions in the Social
Game according to Young(1993).
Since d + e < b + f, the former pair (®;®) is a pareto dominant equilibrium and the latter
pair (¯;¯) is a risk dominant equilibrium. Intuitively the former pair is eﬃcient but more risky
in coordination. As for formal deﬁnitions, see Harsanyi and Selten(1988).
Lemma 2.2. If the symmetric coordination game satisﬁes Assumption 2 then e < f < b < d
or e < b < f < d.
Proof. Since d > f and d > b > e, d is the maximal payoﬀ. By d + e < b + f, e ¡ f < b ¡ d.
Since d is the maximal payoﬀ, e ¡ f < b ¡ d < 0. Therefore e < f < d and e < b.
¥
9A Nash equilibrium strategy proﬁle x is strict if the best reply to the x is only x itself.
8We call e < f < b < d Case 1 and e < b < f < d Case 2 in Section 4.
Deﬁnition 8. 1. Direct Link Case : Distinct players, i and j play the coordination game
when ¯ gij = 1.
2. Indirect Link Case : Distinct players, i and j play the coordination game when i
¯ g
Ã! j.
This assumption is called as one sided links because it is no need for the realization of the
play that both players establish the link between them. Due to this assumption, the high link
cost players may freely ride on low cost players for playing the Social game.
Net payoﬀs
Let players be located on a ﬁxed network g 2 G. Given the network g, each player plays an
action in A. A net payoﬀ is a value of a function on the set G £ A.
Based on Assumption 1,3 and Table 1, for each (g;a) 2 G£A,10 the net payoﬀ for a type x
player i is deﬁned as follows.11
1. Direct Links case. Πi(g;a) =
P
j2Nd(i;¯ g) vi(ai;aj) ¡ kx ¢ ºd(i;g)
2. Indirect Links case. ˆ Πi(g;a) =
P
j2N(i;¯ g) vi(ai;aj) ¡ kx ¢ ºd(i;g)
In these equations, kx is the cost function of player i’s unit active link. vi(ai;aj) represents
player i’s gross payoﬀ depending on only actions chosen. By ﬁgure vi(®;®) = d, vi(¯;¯) = b,
vi(®;¯) = e, and vi(¯;®) = f. Note that in the indirect link case the gross payoﬀs occur at the
game with players indirectly linked. At Figure 3 Nd(1; ¯ g) = f2;5g and N(1; ¯ g) = f2;3;4;5g.
Nl = f4;5g and Nh = f1;2;3g. a = (®;®;®;¯;¯). 1®
h represents that player 1 is a high link cost










Π1(g;a) = v(®;®) + v(®;¯) ¡ kh ¢ 1
= d + e ¡ kh ¢ 1
ˆ Pi1(g;a) = 2v(®;®) + 2v(®;¯) ¡ kh ¢ 1
= 2d + 2e ¡ kh ¢ 1
Figure 3.
10(g;a) represents a pair of a network form and an action proﬁle of all players. That is, g = (g1;g2;::: ;gn) 2
f0;1g
(n¡1)n
and a = (a1;a2;::: ;an) 2 f®;¯g
n.
11When the link cost is a function of the number of active link, the net payoﬀ is deﬁned as follows where x is
in fh;lg.
1. Direct Links case. Πi(g;a) =
P
j2Nd(i;¯ g) vi(ai;aj) ¡ º
d(i;g) ¢ kx(º
d(i;g))
2. Indirect Links case. ˆ Πi(g;a) =
P
j2N(i;¯ g) vi(ai;aj) ¡ º
d(i;g) ¢ kx(º
d(i;g)).
Note that the link cost kx is a function over the number of directly linked players.
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3.1 Unperturbed Adaptation Rule
Players play the above coordination game repeatedly but the network formation may change over
the time. Follwing adaptation behaviors of players cause a dynamic process. Each player adjusts
the action and the links myopically, which is interpred as one of the best response dynamics
(Matsui(1992)). Let gt¡1 is the network and at¡1 is the action proﬁle at the end of a period
t ¡ 1. Similary gt
ij represents a link ij at period t. In the next period t, an adaptation occurs
through two steps.
In conditions below, g + ij represents a graph of which gij is replaced with 1. Of course if
gt¡1
ij = 1, then no replacement occurs. g ¡ ij represents a graph of which gij replaced with 0.
If gt¡1
ij = 0, then no replacement occurs. For example, if g = ((g12;g13);(g21;g23);(g31;g32)) =
((1;1);(1;0);(0;1)) then g + 12 = 1, g ¡ 12 = 0, g + 31 = 1 and g ¡ 31 = 0.




and for any i, j 2 N, pij > 0. This probabilities are determined exogenously.
If Πi(gt¡1 + ij;at¡1) > Πi(gt¡1;at¡1) then gt
ij = 1.
If Πi(gt¡1 ¡ ij;at¡1) > Πi(gt¡1;at¡1) then gt
ij = 0.
If each equation holds with equality then gt¡1 remains.
At this point gt is determined.




and for any k 2 N, qk > 0. If the picked up player k has been linked with at least one
another player in the network gt formed at step 1, an adaptation for actions occurs. In
the condition below, at¡1
k represents an action proﬁle except the player k at period t ¡ 1.
Therefor (¢;at¡1
k ) 2 A.:
If Πk(gt;(®;at¡1
¡k )) > Πk(gt;(¯;at¡1
¡k )) then k chooses an action ®.
If Πk(gt;(®;at¡1
¡k )) < Πk(gt;(¯;at¡1
¡k )) then k chooses an action ¯.
If each equation holds with equality then at¡1 remains.
If the picked up player k is not linked with no player of the netwok gt, then he choose
an action that maximizes his payoﬀ under a condition that all the other players would
establish links with the player k.
At this point at is determined.
At the end of the period t, All players play the coordination game with directly(indirectly)
linked players if such players exist. Then they get net payoﬀs of the period t deﬁned at the last
section.
At the step 1, given a network and an action proﬁle of the last period t ¡ 1, a randomly se-
lected player i decides whether or not he(she) maintains/establishes a randomly selected his(her)
10connection with a player j. At the step 2, given a network formed at the step 1 and an action
proﬁle of the last period t ¡ 1, a randomly selected player choosees the best action of the coor-
dination game.At the step 3, payoﬀs realizes. These steps in a period is summerized at Figure
4 below.




network action proﬁle payoﬀ
(gt¡1;at¡1)
Figure 3. unperturbed adaptation rule
3.2 Markov chain
By this adaptation rule for each period t, we can deﬁne a discrete time Markov process P on a
ﬁnite state space S = G £ A:12 This process speciﬁes the probability of transiting to each state
in S in the next period, given that the process is currently in some given state s. For every
pair of states s, s0 2 S, and every time t ¸ 0, let Pss0 be the transition probability of moving to
state s0 at time t + 1 conditional on being in state s at period t. Since Pss0(t) is independent of
t due to our deﬁnition of the adaptation process, the transition probabilities are called as time
homogenous. We identify the process P with the corresponding matrix (Pss0)s2S;s02S.
Lemma 3.1. Our adaptation rule deﬁnes a time homogenous Markov process.
Proof. By deﬁnition of our adaptation rule, for any states s,s0 2 S we can deﬁne a unique
transition probability. Thus a Markov process is deﬁed.
Assume that there are periods t,t0 such that Pss0(t) 6= Pss0(t0). Since our adaptation rule
deﬁnes a unique transition probability from any state, this is a contradiction. ¥
See an example (n = 3) at Appendix 2.
A state s0 is accessible from s, if there is a positive probability of moving from s to s0 in a
ﬁnite number of periods. States s and s0 are communicate, written s » s0, if each is accessible
from the other.
Lemma 3.2. The relation s » s0 is an equivalence relation.
Proof. By the deﬁnition directly if s » s0 then s0 » s. If s » s0 and s0 » t then t is accessible
from s by ﬁnite steps.
¥
From this lemma, the state space S is partitioned into equivalent classes, called as commu-
nication classes.
12If a population size is n then the cardinality of S is (n ¡ 1)
n £ 2
n.
11Deﬁnition 9. A recurrent class of a Markov process is a communication class such that no
state outside the class is accessible from any state inside it. A state is recurrent if it is contained
in one of the recurrent classes. A state is absorbing if it is in a recurrent class and the class
is singleton.
Deﬁnition 10. If the process has exactly one recurrent class, which consists of the whole state
space, the process is said to be irreducible.
Let s1;s2;::: ;sM be an enumeration of the states and ¹ = (¹(s1);¹(s2);::: ;¹(sM)) where
M =j S j.
Deﬁnition 11. A stationary distribution ¹ of our process is the solution of following system
of liner equations.
¹P = ¹, where ¹ ¸ 0 and
P
s2S ¹(s) = 1.
The ﬁrst equation of this deﬁnition is called a stationary equation which represent that the
stationary distribution ¹ is a ﬁxed point of the Markov process. About the existence and its
uniqueness of the stationary distribution the next lemma is well known.
Lemma 3.3. The stationary equation in above deﬁnition has a unique solution if and only if
the process is irreducible.
Lemma 3.4. The Markov process deﬁned by our unperturbed adaptation rule needs not has a
unique stationary distribution.
Proof. Consider two states such that (g1;a1), g1 2 Ge and a1 = ®n , (g2;a2), g2 2 ge and
a2 = ¯n. If a high type link cost is lower than b, then there emerges no players ¯ gij = 0 in both
state. Since both action proﬁles are strict Nash, no players have incentive to change actions.
Therefore each of (g1;a1) and (g2;a2) is a sigleton recurrent class. Because the process needs
not be irreducible, it may not have a unique stationary distribution.
¥
3.3 Perturbed adaptation rule
Consider our Markov process P deﬁned on a ﬁnite state space S. A perturbation of P is a
Markov Process whose transition probabilities are slightly perturbed or distorted versions of
the transition probabilities Ps;s0. This perturbation for our Markov Process is derived from
modiﬁcation of the above adaptation rules.
Let gt¡1 is the network and at¡1 the action proﬁle at the end of a period t ¡ 1. In the
next period t, through following four steps the adaptation occurs. In conditions below, g + ij
represents a graph of which gij replaced with 1. Of course if gt¡1
ij = 1, then no replacement
occurs. g ¡ij represents a graph of which gij replaced with 0. If gt¡1
ij = 0, then no replacement
occurs.




and for any i,j 2 N pij > 0. This probability is determined exogenously.
If Πi(gt¡1 + ij;at¡1) > Πi(gt¡1;at¡1) then the player i establishes the link ij.
If Πi(gt¡1 ¡ ij;at¡1) > Πi(gt¡1;at¡1) then player i severes the link ij.
If each equation holds with equality then gt¡1 remains.
122. (Experiments, mutations for links)After this link formation by players, Nature adds the
link which was served at step 1 of this period t by player i with small probability ° > 0
and let them keep unestablished with probability 1 ¡°. Nature also serves the link which
was established at step 1 of this period t by players i with small probability ° > 0 and
remains with probability 1 ¡ °.
At this point, a network of the period t, gt, is determined.




and qk > 0 for any k 2 N. If the picked up player k is linked with at least one another
player in the network gt, an adaptation for an action choice occurs.
If Πk(gt;(®;at¡1
¡k )) > Πk(gt;(¯;at¡1
¡k )) then player k chooses an action ®.
If Πk(gt;(®;at¡1
¡k )) < Πk(gt;(¯;at¡1
¡k )) then player k chooses an action ¯.
If each equation holds with equality then at¡1 remains.
If the picked up player k is not linked with no player of the netwok gt, then he choose
an action that maximizes his payoﬀ under a condition that all the other players would
establish links with the player k.
4. (Experiments, mutations for actions)After this choice of the action by player k, with small
probability " > 0 Nature makes the player k choose an action which was not choosen by
the player k at the step 3 of this period. With probability 1 ¡ " > 0 the choice made by
the player k is unchanged by Nature.
At this point, an action proﬁle of the period t, at, is determined.
At the end of period all players play the coordination game with directly connected players
if such players exist. Then they get net payoﬀs of the period deﬁned at the last section.
Note that at the step 2 and 4 small probabilities of mutations are introduced. The former
° may be interpred as the probability of an experimentation for link formation. The latter " is
interpreted as the probability for action choice.
3.4 Perturbed Markov process
Lemma 3.5. Our perturbed adaptation rule at each period deﬁne a homogeneous Markov process
P(";¹) depending on ", ¹.
See an example at Appendix 2.
Lemma 3.6. For our perturbed Markov Process there exists an unique stationary distribution
¹(";°) such that ¹(";°)P(";°) = ¹(";°).
Proof. By the deﬁnition of our perturbed adaptation rule, the corresponding Markov process is
irreducible. From the lemma 3, this process has a unique stationary distribution. ¥
To simplify our analysis the perturbed adaptation and corresponding Markov process is
restricted a regular process deﬁned below. For our Markov process to be the regular perturbed
Markov process about only ², we suppose that a convergence of " and ° becomes a same rate.
13Assumption 3. There is a constant r > 0 such that " = r°.
°(") represents that ° depends on ² due to above Assuption.
Deﬁnition 12 (Young(1993,1998)). A Markov Process P(";°(")) is a regular perturbed






if Ps;s0(";°(")) > 0 for some " > 0, then 0 < lim
"!0
Ps;s0(";°("))
"r(s;s0) < 1 for some r(s;s0) ¸ 0.
The real number r(s;s0) is called as the resistence of the transition from s to s0. Note also
that Ps;s0 > 0 if and only if r(s;s0) = 0. For convenience, we shall adopt the convention that
r(s;s0) = 1 if Ps;s0(";¹) = Ps;s0 = 0 for all " 2 [0; ¯ "].
Lemma 3.7. Our perturbed Markov process P(";°) is a regular perturbed Markov process.
Proof. From Asuumption 3, it holds true clearly.
¥




Due to Assumption 3, it is possible to deﬁne stochastically stable states by a convergence of
only ".
3.5 Computation of stochastically stable states
Based on the appendix in Young(1993) it is summerized how to compute stochastically stable
states for any regular perturbed Markov process P(²;°(²)) on the ﬁnite state space S. Let P have
recurrent classes E1;E2;::: ;EK. For each pair of distinct recurrent classes Ei and Ej, an ij-path
is a sequence of states ³ = (s1;s2;::: ;sq) that begins in Ei and ends in Ej. The resistence of this
path is the sum of the resistence of its edges, that is, r(³) = r(s1;s2)+r(s2;s3)+:::+r(sq¡1;sq).
Let rij = min r(³) be the least resistence over all ij-paths ³. Now construct a complete directed
graph with K vertices, one for each recurrent class. The vertex corresponding to a recurrent
class Ej will be called j. The weight on the directed edge i ! j is rij. A tree rooted at vertex
j (called a j-tree) is a set of K ¡1 directed edges such that, from every vertex diﬀerent from j,
there is a unique directed path in the tree to j.
The resistence of a rooted tree T is the sum of the resistences rij on the K ¡ 1 edges that
compose it. The stochastic potential pj of the recurrent class Ej is deﬁned as the minimum
resistence over all trees rooted at j.
Theorem 3.1. (Young[1993])
Let P(";°(")) be a regular perturbed Markov Process of P, and let ¹(";°(")) be the unique
stationary distribution of P(";°(")) for each " > 0, ° = r". Then lim
"!0
¹(";°(")) = ¹ exists and
¹ is a stationary distrubution of P. The stochastically stable states are precisely those states




This theorem is directely used to investigate the stchastically stable convention and network
formation of our model. We will ﬁnd recurrent classes which are minimum over all recurrent
classes of our Markov process P.
4 Stochastically stable convention and network formation in the
direct link case
We call a state (a¤;g¤) which is stochastically stable as stochastically stable convention and
network. Stochastcally stable conventions and network formation depends cost levels of kh and
kl. Some cases of diﬀerent cost parameters are investigated. Let N®(a) be the set of players
choosing ® at the proﬁle a. jNj,jNlj,jNhj represent cardinalities of each set. For any action
proﬁle ax, ax
i is a player i’s action under ax. As an example of our analysis, we investigate Case
0 as following. After Case 0, we will investigate Case 1 and Case 2 which were assorted on
Lemma 2.2.
4.1 Case 0: d > kh >maxff;bg and kl < min ff;bg
Only states that all players take an identical action are absorbing for the unperturbed dynamics
P in this case. A uniform convention emerges. It is possible for each action ® and ¯ to become
the convention based on the process P.
Lemma 4.1. If the link cost parameters satisfy d > kh > maxff;bg and kl < minff;bg then the
set of absorbing states for the unperturbed process P is classiﬁed into two groups. The ﬁrst class
is the set of states such that the network is eﬃciently formed and fully connected, and all players
play the action ®. The second class is the set of states such that the network is established by
only the low cost players and all players play the action ¯. Formally this statement is as follows.
The ﬁrst class E®
1 of the absorbing states is a set of pairs f(g;a)g such that g 2 Ge and for
any i 2 N ai = ®.
The second class E
¯
0 of the absorbing states is a set of pairs f(g;a)g such that for any pair
(i;j) 2 Nl £ Nh gij = 1 and gji = 0, for any i,j 2 Nh gij = 0, and for any i 2 N ai = ¯.
Proof. At any period t ¡ 1, if pij > 0 and i 2 Nl then gt
ij = 1 since kl < minff;bg. Since Q
(i;j)2Nl£N pij > 0 and jNj is ﬁnite, a state s where for any i 2 Nl and for any j 2 N, gij = 1




(d ¡ e) + (f ¡ b)









15a state s0 such that all players choose ¯, for any i 2 Nl and j 2 Nh (gij = 1 and gji = 0),
and for any i;j 2 Nl ( ¯ gij = 1 and gij = 1 ! gji = 0) is accessible from the state s. Since
kh > maxf;b no high cost player establish new active links from the state s0. Therefore no state
outside s0 is accessible from s0.
If at state s,
k® ¸
(b ¡ e)Nl
(d ¡ e) + (f ¡ b)












a state s00 such that all plays ® and g 2 Ge is accessible from s. Since no player will establish
new active link and choose ¯ from s00, no outside state is accessble from s00.
Because in an eﬃciently formed network only one side of any link must establishes it and




To conﬁrm this lemma see the ﬁgure below. The the set of players N is assumed to be
f1;2;3;4;5;6g, Nl = f1;2g and Nh = f3;4;5;6g. 1®
h represents that the player 1 is high cost




































Note that each state in Ex
i can be reached each other by a chain of states in Ex
i . This chain
is constructed as following. Assume that in a state s one mutation occurs and the perturbed
process P(";°) transits into a state s0. From s0, the process goes into a state s00 due to the
unperturbed process P. Then we write s ! s0. The chain between states z and z0 is a set C
which consists of states z1;z2;::: ;zm¡1;zm in recurrent states such that z1 = z, zm = z0 and
z1 ! z2 ! ::: ! zm¡1 ! zm. Denote a set of states which have some chains with a state s be
C(s).
16Lemma 4.2. If a state s is stochastically stable and s0 2 C(s) then s0 is also stochastically
stable.
This idea is shown in Noldeke and Samuelson(1993).
Proof. Consider s-tree. By assumption the s has minimam stochastic potential. In the tree,
reverse directions all edges between s and s0. This set of reversed edges is a chain from s to s0
and constitute a path of s0 of a s0 tree. By the deﬁnition of a chain, this s0 tree must have the






s0 has also the minimum stochastic potential.
Figure 5.
Lemma 4.3. For any state s and s0 2 E®
1 (E
¯
0), there is a chain between s and s0.
Proof. Let gij = 1 in s. By one mutation such that i serves an active link ij, our perturbed
process goes into a state t where gij = 0 and other. From t our unperturbed process P can
reach a state z 2 Ex
i such that gji = 1. Without confusion we can write gij = 1 ! gji = 1. Due
to this proceedings, we can construct a chain between any states s and s0 in Ex
i .
¥
Since any states s and s0 which are connected by a chain has the same stochastic potential,
we regard a weight of a state s as a weight of a set C(s). So we expand the concept of a least
weighted tree of a state to a set Ex
i and denote it by Ex
i ¡ tree.
Theorem 4.1. In Case 0,
jNlj < d
j(N ¡ 1)j(d ¡ f)
(b ¡ e)
e
if and only if E®
1 is the set of stochastically stable states.
Proof. By Lemma 4.1, Lemma 4.2 and Lemma 4.3, it is suﬃcient to compare the stochastic
potentioal of E®
1 to that of E
¯
0. Let each resistence be r1;®,r0;¯. These correspond to the
number of mutations for the process P(";°) to transit into the concerning set of absorbing sets
17from the other set of absorbing sets. To escape from E®
1 it is needed and suﬃcient for the
number of mutations (¯ players ) to exeed a threshold over the whole players. Because at E®
1 ,
players are fully connected, the threshold or the basin of attraction for E®
1 is the same value as
the random matching case. Therefore
r0;¯ = d
j(N ¡ 1)j(d ¡ f)
(b ¡ f) + (d ¡ e)
e
To escape from E
¯
0, the needed number of mutations is
minfd
jNlj(b ¡ e)
(b ¡ f) + (d ¡ e)
e;d
jNj(b ¡ e)
(b ¡ f) + (d ¡ e)
eg
The former condition in above minf¢;¢g represents a case that mutations occurs over only the
low cost players who establish the whole network. The latter represents a case that mutations




(b ¡ f) + (d ¡ e)
e · d
jNj(b ¡ e)





(b ¡ f) + (d ¡ e)
e
.
By comparing r0¯ to r1®, we get this theorem.
¥
At Figure 6 an example of Theorem 4.1 is drawn for Theorem 4.1. Bold arrows represents
transitions with mutations. Normal and dashed arrows represents transitions due to best re-
sponses. At the begining low cost players mute and switch to ®. This example shows that at






























This case is the one of the most interesting cases. The low link cost players who choose ¯ are
willing to add links with any miscoordinated players . Then high cost link players can free ride
on the link established by the low cost player, and all players are connected only one network.
That is, there is no isolated players.
By free riding on link formations of high cost players, pareto domonant convention emerges.
4.2 Case 1: e < f < b < d
We assume e < f < b < d. Except a pattern such that d > kh >maxff;bg and kl < min ff;bg,
there are following nine cases.
Lemma 4.4. (Case 1.0)









2 is a set f(g2;a2)g such that g2 2 Ge and for any i 2 N, a2
i = ¯.
Lemma 4.5. (Case 1.1)









2 is a set f(g2;a2)g such that g2 2 Ge and for any i 2 N, a2
i = ¯.
Lemma 4.6. (Case 1.2)









2 is a set f(g2;a2)g such that g2 2 Ge and for any i 2 N, a2
i = ¯.
Proof. (Case 1.0, Case 1.1, Case 1.2) In these three cases, at any period t ¡ 1 if i 2 Nl and
pij > 0 then gt
ij = 1 for any jinN. That is, if a low cost player is picked up at step 1, the player
must establish an active link with any player. Therefore from any initial state, a fully connected








a fully connected network is approached.)
Once our process P transits into a state such that the network is fully connected, each player








all players necessarily coordinate on an action. ¥
Lemma 4.7. (Case 1.3)














i = ®, a
(t¡1)
j = ¯, and i 2 Nl j 2 Nh. Since pji > 0, gt
ji = 1 occurs with the
positive probability pji > 0 on the condition that a
(t¡1)
i = ®, a
(t¡1)





j = ¯, and i 2 Nh j 2 Nl. Since pji > 0, gt
ji = 1 occurs with the positive probability pji > 0
on the condition that a
(t¡1)
i = ®, a
(t¡1)
j = ¯. Anyway even if there is a miscoordination, one
side player choosing ¯ will linked with any player. Therefore from any state a fullly connected
network will be approached with a positive probability by ﬁnite steps. Once the fully connected
network is formed, if gij = 1 and gji = 1, pij > 0 then the player servers the link ij. Therefore
eﬃciently network must be reached.
Once eﬃciently connected network is reached, all player necessarily coordinate on an action
by ﬁnite steps. ¥
Theorem 4.2. In Case 1.0, Case 1.1, Case 1.2, Case 1.3, E®
1 is the set of stochastically stable
states.






















(jNj ¡ 1)(d ¡ f)





(jNj ¡ 1)(b ¡ e)
(b ¡ f) + (d ¡ e)
e
where d¢e represents the least integer larger than ¢.
By Assumption 2, rm
21 > rm
12. Therefore by Lemma any state in E
¯
2 minimize a stochastic
potential.
¥
Lemma 4.8. (Case 1.4)
















3 is a set f(g3;a3)g such that for any pair (i;j) 2 Nh £ Nh ¯ gij = 1, gij = 1 ! gji = 0,
and ai = aj = ¯, and for any pair (k;l) 2 Nl £ Nl ¯ gkl = 1, gkl = 1 ! glk = 0, and ak = al = ®.
Proof. Since kl;kh < b < d, if the action is coordinated between a pair (i;j) 2 N £ N, then
¯ gij = 1. But if i 2 Nl, j 2 Nh ai = ® and aj = ¯ then ¯ gij = 0.
¥
Theorem 4.3. In Case 1.4, jNlj < jNhj if and only if E®
1 is the set of stochastically stable
states.
Proof. By simple calculation each Ei ¡ tree has an weight as follows.(See Figure 6.)
E®
1 : rm




21 or (jNj ¡ 1) ¡ jNlj
E3: rm
12 + jNlj or rm
21 + jNhj or jNj.
By comparing these weights we complete the proof.
¥
Lemma 4.9. (Case 1.5)


















3 is a set f(g3;a3)g such that for any pair (i;j) 2 Nh £ Nh ¯ gij = 1, gij = 1 ! gji = 0,
and ai = aj = ¯, and for any pair (k;l) 2 Nl £ Nl ¯ gkl = 1, gkl = 1 ! glk = 0, and ak = al = ®.
E
¯;®
4 is a set f(g4;a4)g such that for any pair (i;j) 2 Nh £ Nh ¯ gij = 1, gij = 1 ! gji = 0,
and ai = aj = ®, and for any pair (k;l) 2 Nl £ Nl ¯ gkl = 1, gkl = 1 ! glk = 0, and ak = al = ¯.
Eiso
5 is a set f(g5;a5)g such that there are some isolated players choosing x and other players
are connected and coordinated on another action y.




5. All players can not link with others when they
coordinate on the action ¯. Thus initially players choosing ¯ of high link costs will change their
action.
And link cost is high enough for low type players to link with miscoordinated players. There-
fore there may be separeted two populations which are coordinated ondiﬀerent actions each
other.
¥




Theorem 4.4. In Case 1.5, E
¯
2 is only stochastcally stable.
Proof. Since the link cost kh is less than b, we can use a standard argument of Kandori et,al(1993)
and Young(1993).
¥
Lemma 4.10. (Case 1.6)










6 is a set f(g6;a6)g such that for any i;j 2 Nl ¯ gij = 1, gij = 1 ! gji = 0, for any k;l 2 Nh
¯ gij = 0, for any i 2 Nl k 2 Nh gik = 1 and gki = 0, and for any i 2 Ni a6
i = ¯.
Eiso
5 is a set f(g5;a5)g such that there are some isolated players choosing x and other players
are connected and coordinated on another action y.
Proof. E
¯
6 is only the case diﬀerent above lemmas. In this case, since high cost players cannot
link with others when coordinated on ¯. Thus only low cost players can establish links with all
players by ﬁnite steps.
¥
Theorem 4.5. In Case 1.6, if
jNlj < d






5 are the sets of stchastically stable states.
Otherwise E
¯
6 is the state of stchastically stable states.
Proof. Similar to Theorem 4.1. Thus it is omitted.
¥










5 is a set f(g5;a5;¯)g such that there are some isolated players choosing ¯ and other
players are connected and coordinated on another action ®.
22Proof. Only players coordinating on ® have an incentive to establish an active link. Since a
miscoordinated player chooseing ¯ does not have establish an active link, he will be isolated.
¥
Theorem 4.6. In Case 1.8 E®
1 is a unique set of the stochastically stable states.
Proof. This case is investigated by Goyal and Vega-Redondo(1999). Thus omitted.
¥
Lemma 4.12. (Case 1.9)




Proof. This case is the same one of Kandori,et,al(1993) and Young(1993). Thus omitted.
¥
5 Concluding Remarks of the direct link case and An Applica-
tion
5.1 Concluding Remarks
We have analyzed mainly the direct link case. Roughly speaking the performance of the indirect
link case model is very similar to our main result Theorem 4. According to Goyal and Vega-
Redondo, indirect link case derive the Star network as unique strict Nash equilibrium of a
network formation game.13 This fact is easily checked by deﬁnitions in our Section 2,3. Since in
indirect link case each player can play the coordination game with all other players through at
most one link, they have no incentives to add more links. At this Star network since the unique
support(center) player has ultimately strong power to upset the convention, the stochastically
stable action may be ®. The role of the center player is very similar to the role of the low cost
players in our model. These precise relations are one of the interesting future researchs.
We suppose link cost as a constant value, but as say at section 2, the link cost may be convex
function of active links in the real communication. As Jackson and Watts shows, this link cost
restricts the number of full connected players in a network. If asymmetricity of cost is introduced
too, distinct convention regions may emerge. This will be more exiting futur research.
13Note their adaptation process is diﬀerent from our model about steps in a period.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Case 2: e < b < f < d
We use the same notations as case 1 for the set of absorbing states. Proofsand Studying stochas-
tically stabilities are similar to Case 1 for each case. Thus this cases are written at an Appendix
and proofs are omitted.
24Lemma 7.1. (Case 2.0)




Lemma 7.2. (Case 2.1)




Proof. Low link cost players establish active links with any player. Proof is same as Case 1.0,
1.1, 1.2.
¥
Lemma 7.3. (Case 2.2)




6 is a set f(g6;a6)g such that for anyi;j 2 Nl ¯ gij = 1, gij = 1 ! gji = 0, for any k;l 2 Nh
¯ gij = 0, for any i 2 Nl k 2 Nh gik = 1 and gki = 0, and for any 2 Ni a6
i = ¯.
Proof. Since b < kh < f, in a coordination on ¯ any high cost player serves any active link.
Precise proof is shown at Case 0.
¥
Lemma 7.4. (Case 2.3)




Proof. Proof is same as Case 1.3.
¥
Lemma 7.5. (Case 2.4)




Proof. Since b < kh < f, in a coordination on ¯ any high cost player serves any active link.
Precise proof is shown at Case 0.
¥
Lemma 7.6. (Case 2.5)






7 is a set f(g7;a7)g such that for any i 2 N a7
i = ¯ and for any i,j 2 N ¯ gij = 0.
Proof. Since b < kh;kl < f, in a coordination on ¯ no player serves any active link. But at any
miscoordination state any ¯ player establish active link with ® player.
¥
Lemma 7.7. (Case 2.6)






5 is a set f(g5;a5;¯)g such that there are some isolated players choosing ¯ and other
players are connected and coordinated on another action ®.
Lemma 7.8. (Case 2.7)






5 is a set f(g5;a5;¯)g such that there are some isolated players choosing ¯ and other
players are connected and coordinated on another action ®.
25Lemma 7.9. (Case 2.8)






8 is a set such that there are some isolated players choosing ¯ and other players
are connected and coordinated on another action ®.Where players who are connected care low
cost players.
Lemma 7.10. (Case 2.9)
If d < kl;kh, then the sets of absorbing states are E®
0 and E
¯
0.
26